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In a series of early morning phone calls on December 7, 2006,
seven United States Attorneys were ordered to resign. Despite initial
denials, it would later be revealed that two other U.S. Attorneys had also
been ordered to submit their resignations, bringing the total number to
nine. Each was given no explanation for the dismissal and most were led
to believe that they alone were being dismissed, raising the specter of
unstated wrongdoing and encouraging silent departures. Those dis-
missed uniformly cited the maxim that they "served at the pleasure of the
President" and most sought to avoid publicly disputing the Justice De-
partment or the White House.
So what happened? Why were the nine dismissed? Were political
considerations allowed to trump the proud heritage of non-partisan, inde-
pendent prosecutions in a Justice Department widely trusted as the
guardian of civil rights? Did the White House or senior Justice Depart-
ment officials direct the removal of U.S. Attorneys for failing to satisfy
local partisans or to retaliate for certain public corruption prosecutions?
Have officials lied to cover up wrongdoing and to avoid criminal prose-
cution? Can the damage to the Justice Department be undone, restoring
the role of federal prosecutors as disdainful of politics and devoted to
accountability, fairness, and the firm execution of the nation's laws?
These questions were the subject of a public forum on May 9, 2007,
sponsored by Seattle University School of Law, and serve in part as the
basis for this Article by one of the participants of the forum (and a fired
U.S. Attorney).'
t John McKay served as United States Attorney for the Western District of Washington from Octo-
ber 2001 until he and eight others were ordered to resign, which he did in January 2007. He is cur-
rently Professor from Practice at Seattle University School of Law where he teaches Constitutional
Law of Terrorism and National Security Law. He wishes to thank his research assistant, Peter A.
Talevich, for his invaluable aid in the preparation of this Article.
1. This Article follows Seattle University Law School's "Public Policy Forum-United States
Attorneys: Roles and Responsibilities" held in Seattle on May 9, 2007. The author is grateful to the
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I. BACKGROUND TO A SCANDAL
When I arrived at my Seattle office early on the morning of
December 7, 2006, a typically dark and rainy day, I had a message to call
Michael Battle, then-Director of the Executive Office for United States
Attorneys in the Department of Justice.2 Although a friend, his tone was
terse as he told me that "the Administration wanted a change" and that I
should "move on" by the end of the following month.
Knowing that U.S. Attorneys were rarely, if ever, relieved for rea-
sons other than misconduct in office, I asked Mike for an explanation.
Offering none, he said the "Administration wanted to go in another direc-
tion." After pondering this in silence for a few moments, Battle then of-
fered that "sometimes it's hard not to think you did something wrong
when you get a call like this, but that's not always the case." Although
circumspect in his remarks, I had just been given a clue that something
was amiss. "Wait a minute," I said slowly, "I'm not the only one getting
this call, am I?" Battle awkwardly said, "John, I don't have any informa-
tion on that." I suspected otherwise, but thanked Battle for the call, sin-
cerely grateful that it had come from a friend and not one of those who
lacked the courage to carry out their own misguided plans.
Hanging up the phone, I stared out the window into the gray morn-
ing Seattle skies with a faint smile, as I drummed my fingers on a con-
ference table. "This will not end as they think it will," I thought, and
began to make plans to inform the First Assistant U.S. Attorney and to
leave the office I had been so honored to lead for the past five years.
By the end of that day we would learn that six other United States
Attorneys had received calls from Battle indicating that the "Administra-
tion" sought their resignations.3 Because U.S. Attorneys serve "at the
pleasure" of the President, some questioned whether the President him-
self had ordered the resignations, but all understood that we would not
have received such a call absent the explicit approval of the White
House. We also knew that Attorney General Alberto Gonzales was a
close friend of the President, and even those of us with political muscle
were no match against this dynamic. Consequently, all nine U.S.
authors of other articles submitted herein, in particular Professor Emeritus James Eisenstein of Penn-
sylvania State University and Professor Laurie Levenson of Loyola Law School.
2. Battle had served as U.S. Attorney in the Western District of New York. He resigned from
the Justice Department on March 16, 2007.
3. U.S. Attorneys serving in San Francisco, San Diego, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico and the
Western District of Michigan also received calls from Mike Battle on December 7 ordering them to
resign. Earlier, U.S. Attorneys in Little Rock and Kansas City had been secretly told to step down.
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Attorneys eventually tendered their resignations as instructed, most with
little or no public comment.
II. BLOWING THE WHISTLE-CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
AND THE BEGINNING OF ACCOUNTABILITY
This all changed on January 18, 2007, when Alberto Gonzales testi-
fied before the Senate Judiciary Committee and faced questioning by the
senior senator from California about growing rumors that a number of
U.S. Attorneys had been forced out:
SENATOR FEINSTEIN: Thank you. You and I talked on Tuesday
about what is happening with U.S. Attorneys. It spurred me to do a
little research, and let me begin. Title 28, Section 541 states,
"[e]ach U.S. Attorney shall be appointed for a term of 4 years. On
the expiration of his term, a U.S. Attorney shall continue to perform
the duties of his office until his successor is appointed and quali-
fied."
Now, I understand that there is a pleasure aspect to it, but I also
understand what practice has been in the past. We have thirteen
vacancies. Yesterday you sent up two nominees for the thirteen
existing vacancies.
ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: There have been eleven
vacancies created since the law was changed, eleven vacancies in
the U.S. Attorney's offices. The President has now nominated as to
six of those. As to the remaining five, we are in discussion with
home-state senators. So let me publicly sort of preempt, perhaps, a
question you are going to ask me.
That is, I am fully committed, as the Administration is fully com-
mitted, to ensure that with respect to every U.S. Attorney position in
this country, we will have a presidentially-appointed, Senate-
confirmed U.S. Attorney.
I think a U.S. Attorney, who I view as the leader, law enforcement
leader, my representative in the community, has greater imprimatur
of authority if in fact that person has been confirmed by the Senate.
SENATOR FEINSTEIN: All right. Now, let me get at where I am
going. How many U.S. Attorneys have been asked to resign in the
past year?
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ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: Senator, you are asking me
to get into a public discussion about personnel.
SENATOR FEINSTEIN: No. I am just asking you to give me a
number-that is all.
ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: I do not know the answer.
SENATOR FEINSTEIN: I am just asking you to give me a number.
ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: I do not know the answer
to that question. But we have been very forthcoming-
SENATOR FEINSTEIN: You did not know it on Tuesday when I
spoke with you. You said you would find out and tell me.
ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: I am not sure I said that.
SENATOR FEINSTEIN: Yes, you did, Mr. Attorney General.
ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: Well, if that is what I said,
that is what I will do. But we did provide to you a letter where we
gave you a lot of information about-
SENATOR FEINSTEIN: I read the letter.
ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: All right.
SENATOR FEINSTEIN: It does not answer the questions that I
have. I know of at least six that have been asked to resign. I know
that we amended the law in the Patriot Act and we amended it be-
cause if there were a national security problem the Attorney General
would have the ability to move into the gap. We did not amend it to
prevent the confirmation process from taking place.
I am very concerned. I have had two of them ask to resign in my
state from major jurisdictions with major cases ongoing, with sub-
stantially good records as prosecutors. I am very concerned be-
cause, technically, under the Patriot Act, you can appoint someone
without confirmation for the remainder of the President's term. I do
not believe you should do that. We are going to try to change the
law back.
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ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: Senator, may I just say that
I do not think there is any evidence that that is what I am trying to
do? In fact, to the contrary. The evidence is quite clear that what
we are trying to do is ensure that, for the people in each of these re-
spective districts, we have the very best possible representative for
the Department of Justice and that we are working to nominate
people, and that we are working with home-state senators to get
U.S. Attorneys nominated. So the evidence is just quite contrary to
what you are possibly suggesting. Let me just say-
SENATOR FEINSTEIN: Do you deny that you have asked, your
office has asked, U.S. Attorneys to resign in the past year, yes or
no?
ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: Yes. No, I do not deny
that. What I am saying is that happens during every administration,
during different periods for different reasons. So the fact that that
has happened, quite frankly, some people should view that as a sign
of good management.
What we do, is we make an evaluation about the performance of in-
dividuals. I have a responsibility to the people in your district that
we have the best possible people in these positions. That is the rea-
son why changes sometimes have to be made, although there are a
number of reasons why changes get made and why people leave on
their own.
I think I would never, ever make a change in a U.S. Attorney posi-
tion for political reasons or if it would in any way jeopardize an
ongoing, serious investigation. I just would not do it.
SENATOR FEINSTEIN: Well, let me just say one thing. I believe
very strongly that these positions should come to this committee for
confirmation.
ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: They are, Senator.
SENATOR FEINSTEIN: I believe very strongly we should have the
opportunity to answer questions about it.
2008]
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ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES: I agree with you.
4
At least one U.S. Attorney, the author of this Article, observed this
exchange between Senator Diane Feinstein (D-Cal.) and Attorney
General Gonzales with complete dismay. After a flurry of phone calls
among the U.S. Attorneys who had been ordered to resign, many of those
former U.S. Attorneys concluded that the Attorney General was lying to
the Senate about the intent of the Justice Department to seek Senate con-
firmation of their prospective replacements. In Seattle, for example, no
known efforts had been underway by either the White House or the Jus-
tice Department to recruit or interview candidates for my replacement.
In spite of my frequent requests for guidance, Justice officials had not
revealed their plans, and no internal candidates had been contacted by the
Justice Department or the White House. With only a few days remaining
before our departures, it was clear the Justice Department planned to
name their own interim U.S. Attorneys under the new powers granted
them in the amendments to the USA PATRIOT Act.5 Other fired U.S.
Attorneys confirmed similar patterns in San Francisco and San Diego,
and we also knew that an interim U.S. Attorney had been serving in Kan-
sas City for many months.6
Although much media speculation has focused on the later Senate
testimony of then-Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty, 7 it was the
Attorney General's exchange with Senator Feinstein that galvanized the
4. Dep't of Justice Oversight Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 47
(2007) (testimony of Alberto Gonzales) (emphasis added); see Dan Eggen, Prosecutor Firings Not
Political, Gonzales Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2007, at A2.
5. See Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 502, 120 Stat. 192 (2006). With no debate, the Attorney Gen-
eral was given the authority to appoint interim United States Attorneys for indefinite terms without a
Presidential nomination or confirmation by the Senate. Led by Senator Feinstein, the interim ap-
pointment authority was revoked, returning the interim appointment authority to the United States
district courts, in the absence of a presidential appointment. See Pub. L. No. 110-34, 121 Stat. 224
(2007).
6. United States Attorney Todd Graves resigned on March 10, 2006, and was replaced by a
former Civil Rights Division attorney, Bradley Schlozman. It would later be revealed that Graves
had been ordered to resign as well, in order to make way for Schlozman and to facilitate voter fraud
indictments previously rejected by Graves as lacking merit. Schlozman resigned as interim U.S.
Attorney, never having been nominated by the President or facing Senate confirmation. In conten-
tious hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee on June 5, 2007, Mr. Schlozman denied
wrongdoing in bringing indictments for voter registration fraud against four employees of the Asso-
ciation of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN). Dep 't of Justice Oversight Hear-
ing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Bradley Schlozman),
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=2799&wit-id=6502.
7. McNulty testified that, with the exception of Little Rock U.S. Attorney Bud Cummins, who
was removed to make way for Timothy Griffin, a prot6g6 of Karl Rove, the fired U.S. Attorneys
were dismissed for "performance reasons." See discussion and more complete testimony excerpt,
infra, at pp. 6-9.
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soon-to-be former U.S. Attorneys, who began to communicate with each
other almost daily by e-mail and telephone conference calls. Although
he would later characterize the affair as an "overblown personnel mat-
er," in one exchange with a United States Senator, Alberto Gonzales
had managed to drive the fired U.S. Attorneys together and convince
them that he was hiding a sinister purpose in their dismissals and lying to
the Senate to cover it up.
9
At the moment of the Attorney General's responses to Senator
Feinstein, I knew that my silence about my own forced resignation must
end,' ° and in private conversations with several of my colleagues I
learned they had reached the same conclusion at the same moment. In
my case, I believe that silence in the face of a lie is a form of complicity;
despite my initial belief that it was my duty to leave office quietly, I
could not be a part of Alberto Gonzales' false and misleading testimony
to the Senate. We anxiously awaited the February 6 testimony of
McNulty in hopes that other senior officials would correct the record and
reject the contention that we were dismissed to make way for others who
would not be subject to Senate scrutiny. However, that was clearly not
their plan.
On February 6, 2007, then-Deputy Attorney General McNulty
made it clear that we could not expect an honest assessment of their in-
tentions:
MR. McNULTY: First, we never have and never will seek to re-
move a United States Attorney to interfere with an ongoing investi-
gation or prosecution or in retaliation for a prosecution. Such an act
8. In an Op-Ed piece timed for publication on the sixth day that the fired U.S. Attorneys were
testifying under subpoena on Capitol Hill, then-Attorney General Gonzales wrote, "While I am
grateful for the public service of these seven U.S. Attorneys, they simply lost my confidence. I hope
that this episode ultimately will be recognized for what it is: an overblown personnel matter."
Alberto R. Gonzales, They Lost My Confidence, USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 2007, at I OA. He later testi-
fied that he regretted the characterization. Dep "t of Justice Oversight Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 46-47 (Apr. 19, 2007) (testimony of Alberto Gonzales, in response to
question from Sen. Feingold), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/04/19/AR2007041902035_5.html.
9. Kyle Sampson, then Gonzales' Chief of Staff, had already outlined the Justice Department's
plan to bypass Senate confirmation with the appointment of replacement U.S. Attorneys. See E-mail
from Kyle Sampson to then-White House Counsel Harriet E. Miers (Sept. 13, 2006) ("1 strongly
recommend that, as a matter of policy, we utilize the new statutory provisions that authorize the AG
to make USA appointments."), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/Media/PDFS/DOJDocsPt7-
070320.pdf#Page=46; see also Dan Eggen & John Solomon, Firings Had Genesis in White House,
WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2007, at Al.
10. In announcing my resignation on December 14, 2006, I said only that I was "returning to
the private sector." U.S. Attorney John McKay Announces Resignation, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 14,
2006. at A I.
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is contrary to the most basic values of our system of justice, the
proud legacy of the Department of Justice, and our integrity as
public servants.
Second, in every single case where a United States Attorney posi-
tion is vacant, the Administration is committed to filling that posi-
tion with a United States Attorney who is confirmed by the Senate.
The Attorney General's appointment authority has not and will not
be used to circumvent the confirmation process. All accusations in
this regard are contrary to the clear factual record. The statistics are
laid out in my written statement.
And third, through temporary appointments and nominations for
Senate confirmation, the Administration will continue to fill U.S.
Attorney vacancies with men and women who are well-qualified to
assume the important duties of this office.
Mr. Chairman, if I thought the concerns you outlined in your open-
ing statement were true, I would be disturbed, too. But these con-
cerns are not based on facts, and the selection process we will dis-
cuss today I think will shed a great deal of light on that.
Finally, I have a lot of respect for you, Mr. Chairman, as you know.
And when I hear you talk about the politicizing of the Department
of Justice, it is like a knife in my heart. The AG and I love the
Department, and it is an honor to serve. And we love its mission.
And your perspective is completely contrary to my daily experi-
ence, and I would love the opportunity, not just today but in the
weeks and months ahead, to dispel you of the opinion that you
hold.l1
The Deputy Attorney General then announced the initial cover
story for the dismissal of U.S. Attorneys:
SENATOR SCHUMER: All right. Now, let me ask you this: You
admitted-and I am glad you did-that Bud Cummins was fired for
no reason. Were any of the other six U.S. Attorneys who were
asked to step down fired for no reason as well?
MR. McNULTY: As the Attorney General said at his oversight
hearing last month, the phone calls that were made back in Decem-
ber were performance related.
11. Dep't of Justice Oversight Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 10
(Feb. 6, 2007) (testimony of Paul J. McNulty), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/Media/PDFS/0AG 1238-1281 .pdf.
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SENATOR SCHUMER: Mm-hmm. All the others?
MR. McNULTY: Yes.
SENATOR SCHUMER: But Bud Cummins was not one of those
calls because he had been notified earlier.
MR. McNULTY: Right. He was notified in June of-.




Later, Gonzales, McNulty and other Justice Department officials
would have difficulty keeping their stories straight about the reasons for
dismissing nine United States Attorneys in 2006. Faced with glowing
performance evaluations for most of the discharged prosecutors,13 offi-
cials testified at various times to alleged performance, policy, administra-
tive, and personality issues not mentioned in the reports; in many cases,
these issues were simply not believable on their face.1
4
12. Id.
13. The Justice Department's evaluation process for United States Attorneys and their offices
is overseen by the Executive Office for United States Attorneys. Periodic field visits conducted by
professional staff and career attorneys and staff are reported on a multi-year basis in Final Evalua-
tion (EARS) Reports. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorneys, Executive Office for United States
Attorneys' Staffs, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/staff.html#ears. The EARS Report for the
Western District of Washington was based on approximately 170 interviews by twenty-seven inspec-
tors during March 2006 (report on file with U.S. Dep't of Justice).
14. See, e.g., Memorandum from Hon. John Conyers, Jr., Chairman of Comm. on
the Judiciary (July 24, 2007), available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/documents/contemptmemo_072407.pdf.
The case of John McKay is equally troubling. The Administration has now floated
at least five different reasons for the placement of John McKay on the firing list. But
those reasons appear pretextual. The Administration initially claimed that Mr. McKay
was overly aggressive in a meeting on an information sharing program with Deputy At-
torney General McNulty, and that he arranged the sending of a letter advocating for that
program that put the Deputy in an uncomfortable position. Leaving aside the question
whether a responsible Department of Justice would fire a well-performing U.S. Attorney
for such apparently frivolous reasons, those events did not occur until late summer 2006,
but John McKay was on Mr. Sampson's firing list as early as March 2005. At one point,
the Administration claimed that Mr. McKay's office was not sufficiently aggressive in
appealing certain criminal sentences that were below the Guidelines range, but that was
an issue based on a January 2005 Supreme Court decision, and there would not have been
time for follow-up litigation and collection of sentencing data for that controversy to have
contributed to the decision to target McKay for firing two months later.
When further pressed for the reason why Mr. McKay might have been targeted for
firing at that time, the Administration offered reasons that appear even more unlikely.
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Summoned to Capitol Hill, Justice Department officials, led by the
Attorney General, would display appalling losses of memory and incon-
sistent accounts of the firings. Beginning with public statements by
Gonzales, and prior to the release of e-mails and other documents by the
Justice Department, the Attorney General declared to gathered media that
he "was not involved in seeing any memos, was not involved in any dis-
cussions about what was going on." 15 Later testimony by his own Chief
of Staff, Kyle Sampson, together with e-mails showing his presence at a
pivotal meeting in which the list of fired attorneys was approved, would
clearly demonstrate the falsity of Gonzales' claim.16 In his own Senate
testimony on April 19, 2007, Attorney General Gonzales repeatedly
claimed not to recall important events surrounding the forced resigna-
tions-a performance roundly criticized in editorials from around the
country and parodied mercilessly by the nation's comedians and late
night talk show hosts. 17 He has claimed he had delegated the evaluation
and firing process to his Chief of Staff,18 who in turn claimed only to be
an "aggregator" of names supplied by others. 19  Gonzales initially
claimed that he "erred" in not more fully involving Deputy Attorney
General McNulty, but then upon McNulty's resignation tried to lay the
blame on him.z°
One Department witness commented that Mr. McKay had asked some difficult questions
of Attorney General Ashcroft in a public setting that may have put Administration
officials "on the spot," which had occurred before McKay's name was placed on the
March 2005 firing list. Kyle Sampson testified that he may have heard complaints about
Mr. McKay pressing too aggressively for Department action in the aftermath of the mur-
der of one of McKay's Assistant U.S. Attorneys in the time period before the March 2005
list. These would not seem to be credible reasons for the firing of an effective U.S. At-
torney such as John McKay. As suggested above, the available evidence suggests that
improper political factors played an important role in his firing.
Id. at 25-26.
15. Press conference of Alberto Gonzales (Mar. 13, 2007), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2007/agspeech_070313.html.
16. Dep 't of Justice Oversight Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Part III,
110th Cong. 15 (Mar. 29, 2007) (testimony of Kyle Sampson, in response to questions
from Sen. Specter), available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/documents/sampsontranscript032907.html.
17. See, e.g., Uh, mmmm, maybe . .., SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 20, 2007, available at
http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-
bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug-gonzaled20&date=20070420&query-alberto+gonzales; THE
DAILY SHOW (Comedy Central, Apr. 23, 2007).
18. Dep 't of Justice Oversight Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 46-
47 (Apr. 17, 2007) (opening statement of Alberto Gonzales), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=2632&wit-id=3936.
19. Hearing, supra note 16 (opening statement of Kyle Sampson).
20. Hearing, supra note 8 (testimony of Alberto Gonzales); Alberto Gonzales, Remarks at the
Nat'l Press Club, May 15, 2007, available at http://thinkprogress.org/2007/05/l 5/gonzales-mcnulty/.
Train Wreck at the Justice Department
At the end of the day, after hours and hours of both public and
closed session testimony before committees of both the Senate and the
House of Representatives, no Justice Department official would admit
responsibility for placing even one of the fired U.S. Attorneys on the
final list. Little wonder, then, that the focus of both congressional and
media inquiry has been on the role of the White House.
III. SEEDS OF A SCANDAL-THE ROLE OF THE WHITE HOUSE
Although the White House has refused to provide witness testi-
mony or records under claim of executive privilege, e-mails discovered
at the Justice Department revealed that the idea of replacing all of the
U.S. Attorneys originated at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.2' The reasons
for such a replacement are not clear, although in the summer of 2006
White House Senior Counselor Karl Rove openly campaigned against
perceived voter fraud abuse, mentioning by name several jurisdictions,
including the states of Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, Washington, and
Wisconsin. 2
While rejecting the plan to fire all ninety-three U.S. Attorneys,
steps to replace at least some of them, perhaps to appease the White
House, began almost immediately upon Gonzales' arrival to the RFK
Building as Attorney General. Gonzales' Chief of Staff D. Kyle
Sampson, a lawyer with little trial experience and a former White House
staffer, now began assembling a list of U.S. Attorneys to be fired.
Claiming to be the "aggregator" of names, Sampson ignored formal
evaluations long utilized by the Justice Department and appears to have
compiled a "hit list" with the active participation of Attorney General
Gonzales, Deputy Attorney General McNulty, McNulty's Chief of Staff
Michael Elston, Senior Counselor (and White House Liaison) Monica
Goodling, and Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General William
Moschella.
Even as the role of the White House remains shrouded in its claims
of executive privilege,23 certain White House employees appear to have
been heavily involved in the dismissal of U.S. Attorney Iglesias. In
21. Former White House Counsel Harriet Miers first broached the idea, but it was rejected by
both Kyle Sampson and Gonzales. See E-mail from Harriet Miers, White House Counsel, to Kyle
Sampson, Chief of Staff to Alberto Gonzales (Jan. 9, 2006) (referring to Miers' previous inquiry to
whether President Bush should remove and replace all U.S. Attorneys),
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/PDFS/OAG12-22-NEW-.pdf#Page=09. See Eggen & Solomon,
supra note 9.
22. See Dan Eggen & Amy Goldstein, Voter Fraud Complaints By G.O.P. Drove Dismissals,
WASH. POST, May 14, 2007, at A4.
23. Conyers Memorandum, supra note 14, at 42-47.
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several e-mails it appears that these officials were reacting directly to the
complaints of Senator Pete Domenici (R-N.M.) and the ongoing investi-
gation into public corruption in New Mexico. For example, Deputy
White House Counsel Bill Kelley smugly e-mailed Gonzales' Chief of
Staff Kyle Sampson to report that Domenici's office was "happy as a
clam" on learning of Iglesias' ouster.24 Senior Counselor to the President
Karl Rove bragged about Iglesias' dismissal by proclaiming "he's gone"
to the New Mexico Republican Party Chairman, who had previously
complained to Rove about Iglesias.25
IV. HOME ALONE-DISREGARDING THE IMPORTANT
ROLE OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS
With Gonzales and McNulty claiming to be not involved and out of
the loop,26 decisions regarding the careers of nine U.S. Attorneys were
apparently left in the hands of Kyle Sampson, Michael Elston, Monica
Goodling, and others having little or no experience themselves, and even
less knowledge of the effectiveness, capability, or suitability of the na-
tion's chief federal prosecutors.
Kyle Sampson, whom Alberto Gonzales claims led the "review" of
U.S. Attorneys, was a 1996 law school graduate with virtually no trial
experience, and no experience leading significant prosecutions.27 This
did not stop him, however, from seeking to himself become U.S.
24. E-mail from William Kelley, Deputy to White House Counsel Harriet Miers, to
Kyle Sampson, Chief of Staff to Alberto Gonzales (Dec. 7, 2006)
http://judiciary.house.gov/Media/PDFS/DOJDocsPt3O-070320.pdf#Page=25. See Eggen & Solo-
mon, supra note 9.
25. Adam Zagorin, A White House Hand in the Firing?, TIME, Mar. 13, 2007, available at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1598540,00.html.
26. McNulty reportedly testified in closed session that he was not involved in most of
this process. See David Johnston, Gonzales Deputy Quits U.S. Justice Department,
INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, May 15, 2007, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/05/15/america/I 5attomey.php.
While convenient in the face of congressional and Justice Department investigations,
McNulty's claims are preposterous. U.S. Attorneys report through the Deputy Attorney General
(DAG) and the idea that the DAG would not be involved in a process in which even one presiden-
tially-appointed U.S. Attorney would be fired is highly suspect. The apparent deep involvement of
McNulty's former Chief of Staff, Michael Elston, further undercuts his claims of ignorance, as does
the contradicting testimony of Kyle Sampson. See Hearing, supra note 16; Hearing, infra note 31.
Other than a flaccid question concerning the age and work experience of Dan Bogden, the fired U.S.
Attorney in Nevada, see E-mail from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Kyle Sampson,
Chief of Staff to Alberto Gonzales (Dec. 5, 2006),
http://judiciary.house.gov/Media/PDFS/DOJDocsPt2-1070319.pdf#Page=23, McNulty at minimum
did nothing to stop the firings and resulting disrepute to the Justice Department.
27. Hearing, supra note 16 (testimony of Kyle Sampson, responding to questions from Senator
Whitehouse).
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Attorney in Utah despite his lack of qualifications and in spite of the fact
that the highly regarded incumbent had no intention of leaving. 8
Michael Elston, while an experienced Assistant U.S. Attorney, showed
exceedingly poor judgment if, as alleged, he threatened U.S. Attorneys
for speaking to the press and attempted to intimidate them in advance of
the initial Senate testimony of Alberto Gonzales.29
As for Monica Goodling, she has become the poster child for the
under-qualified, overly-political young lawyer given far too much power
at the Justice Department. A 1999 law school graduate of Regent Uni-
versity, she attended Messiah College in Pennsylvania and served stints
in the Office of Public Affairs and the Executive Office for U.S. Attor-
neys, before her appointment as White House Liaison and Senior Coun-
selor to the Attorney General.3° With no significant experience as a
prosecutor, and precious little as an administrator, Ms. Goodling played a
key role in the dismissal of U.S. Attorneys; after first asserting her Fifth
Amendment rights and demanding immunity, Goodling admitted that she
"crossed the line" in considering political beliefs in hiring line
attorneys.31
This apparent disregard for the importance of the role of U.S.
Attorneys in the Administration and the Justice Department, while
shocking to those who have served there, indicates either ignorance or
disregard for the important historical role of these officials. United
States Attorneys are appointed to their offices by the President, who
"shall appoint by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a United
States Attorney for each Judicial District. ' 32 The statute further provides
that "[e]ach United States Attorney is subject to removal by the Presi-
dent., 33 In other words, the President appoints, the Senate confirms, and
while in office U.S. Attorneys serve at the pleasure of the President. All
28. Eric Lipton, Fast-Riser's High Hopes and Sudden Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2007, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/20O7/03/13/washington/I 3sampson.html?_rI &oref=slogin.
29. Dan Eggen & Amy Goldstein, Justice Dept. Official to Quit, WASH. POST, June 16, 2007,
at A6.
30. Alan Cooperman, Bush Loyalist Rose Quickly at Justice, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2007, at
A15.
31. Hearing on the Continuing Investigation into the U.S. Attorney Controversy and Related
Matters, 110th Cong. (May 23, 2007) (statement of Monica Goodling), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/transcripts/goodling-testimony_052307.html
("Nevertheless, I do acknowledge that I may have gone too far in asking political questions of appli-
cants for career positions, and I may have taken inappropriate political considerations into account
on some occasions. And I regret those mistakes."). See also Dan Eggen & Amy Goldstein, Ex-Aide
to Gonzales Accused of Bias, WASH. POST, May 3, 2007, at A l.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006).
33. Id. § 541(c).
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U.S. Attorneys know this, yet all are aware that very few U.S. Attorneys
are dismissed by the President who appointed them.3 4
While serving in office, U.S. Attorneys are considered the chief
federal law enforcement official within their respective districts. They
supervise most investigations in their districts by federal law enforce-
ment agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Drug
Enforcement Agency; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explo-
sives; U.S. Marshal's Service; Bureau of Prisons; Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement; U.S. Secret Service; U.S. Coast Guard; Environ-
mental Protection Agency; and many other agencies. In addition, impor-
tant civil cases in which the United States is a party are overseen by Civil
Divisions in each of the ninety-three U.S. Attorneys' Offices across the
country.
35
To serve effectively, U.S. Attorneys must embrace their role as the
coordinator of federal law enforcement. Strategic planning which identi-
fies gaps in federal law enforcement and addresses these gaps through
deployment of available resources and the development of new
approaches can literally mean the life or death of innocent victims of
crime. International and home grown terrorists, ruthless drug dealers,
human traffickers, environmental polluters, and white collar and corpo-
rate criminals all vie for the attention of the U.S. Attorneys and the men
and woman they lead. The relative paucity of resources at the federal
level requires that federal law enforcement coordinate their work and
share information with their local counterparts. For example, in the
Western District of Washington, less than 150 FBI agents are available
for criminal programs, including counterterrorism, while combined state
and local law enforcement exceeds 10,000 for Washington State.36 Any
commitment to coordinated efforts to prevent and disrupt the next terror-
ist attack on our country requires the systematic sharing of law
34. KEVIN M. SCOTT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS WHO HAVE
SERVED LESS THAN FULL FOUR-YEAR TERMS, 1981-2006 (2007), available at
http://leahy.senate.gov/issues/USAttomeys/ServingLessThan4Years.pdf. In his report, Mr. Scott
finds that only eight U.S. Attorneys were dismissed or instructed to resign from office before expira-
tion of their terms or the election of a new President. Id. at 6-7. Each of these circumstances had
ample evidence of cause for their removals, including one in which it was alleged that an intoxicated
U.S. Attorney bit a stripper. Id at 7.
35. See generally JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. AT7ORNEYS IN
THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS (1978). Although somewhat dated, Dr. Eisenstein's book is
seminal on the role of U.S. Attorneys and is read by many incoming appointees to the Office.
36. Paul Shukovsky, Murray to FBI: You're Putting State at Risk, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 18, 2007, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/localU332032_fbi I 8.html;
WASHINGTON STATE UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, Washington Association of Sheriffs & Police
Chiefs, ii (2006), available at http://www.waspc.org/index.php?c=Crime%20Statistics.
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enforcement records between federal, state, and local law enforcement
The only senior federal official with the ability to lead such sharing ef-
forts and enforce the agreements between the agencies which protect pri-
vacy, advance technology, and secure sensitive information is the United
States Attomey.3
That U.S. Attorneys wield enormous power is well understood, par-
ticularly when considering their direct investigative oversight of gun-
carrying federal agents and their ability to seek criminal arrest, indict-
ment by federal grand juries, and if conviction is obtained, imprisonment
or even execution. That such power should be wielded in a non-political
fashion is axiomatic, as set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Berger v.
United States:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold
aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.
He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should
do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty
to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to
use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
38
37. In the Western District of Washington, a strategic plan requires that the U.S. Attorney's
Office do the following:
[T]ake the lead in bringing all communities in the District together to share intelligence
and investigative information in the JTTF (Joint Terrorism Task Force) Information-
Sharing Initiatives that will link investigations for terrorism as well as Organized Crimi-
nal Enterprise investigations. The local application of this initiative . . . will integrate
Federal, state and local investigative records into a data base to be made available to all
law enforcement agencies in the District.
Strategic Direction 2003-2008: Law Enforcement Community Crime Strategy-Western District of
Washington, 25 (2003) (on file with the U.S. Attorney's Office, Seattle, Washington). This system,
known as the Law Enforcement Information Exchange (LInX), was eventually developed in partner-
ship with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), and was implemented by NCIS in U.S.
Attorney-led initiatives in Washington State, Hawaii, south Texas, Norfolk-Hampton Roads, Vir-
ginia, and Jacksonville. LInX was widely sought after by U.S. Attorneys across the United States;
however, then-Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty withdrew the Justice Department support for
meaningful information sharing shortly after the dismissal of the U.S. Attorneys in December 2006.
See generally Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Dep't of Justice Law
Enforcement Components, "Law Enforcement Information Sharing Policy Statement and Direc-
tives," (Dec. 21, 2006), available at http://i.a.cnn.net/cnn/2006/images/l 2/26/dag.onedoj.pdf.
38. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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Warnings against prosecutorial arrogance and politicization were
handed down long ago by Attorney General and later United States
Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson in words known to many
United States Attorneys, past and present:
The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputa-
tion than any other person in America.... The prosecutor can order
arrests, present cases to the grand jury in secret session, and on the
basis of his one-sided presentation of the facts, can cause the citizen
to be indicted and held for trial .... Because of this immense power
to strike at citizens, not with mere individual strength, but with all
the force of government itself, the post of Federal District Attorney
from the very beginning has been safeguarded by presidential ap-
pointment, requiring confirmation of the Senate of the United
States. . . . There is a most important reason why the prosecutor
should have, as nearly as possible, a detached and impartial view of
all groups in his community .... It is in this realm-in which the
prosecutor picks some person whom he dislikes or desires to embar-
rass, or selects some group of unpopular persons and then looks for
an offense, that the greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting power
lies. It is here that law enforcement becomes personal, and the real
crime becomes that of being unpopular with the predominant or
governing group, being attached to the wrong political views, or be-
ing personally obnoxious to or in the way of the prosecutor himself.
The qualities of a good prosecutor are as elusive and as impos-
sible to define as those which make a gentleman. And those who
need to be told would not understand it anyway. A sensitiveness to
fair play and sportsmanship is perhaps the best protection against
the abuse of power, and the citizens' safety lies in the prosecutor
who tempers zeal with human kindness, who seeks truth and not
victims, who serves the law and not factional purposes, and who
approaches his task with humility.
39
V. UNDER INVESTIGATION-THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
The Inspector General for the Justice Department is empowered to
both fully investigate the actions of the former Attorney General and his
39. Robert H. Jackson, Attorney Gen. & future Supreme Court Justice, Address to United
States Attorneys' Dep't of Justice (Apr. 1, 1940) in 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3-6 (1940),
available at http://www.roberthjackson.org/documents/The%20Federal%20Prosecutor.pdf.
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management team for "waste, fraud and abuse, 'A and, if the facts war-
rant, refer for further investigation and prosecution individuals whom he
concludes have violated criminal laws.4'
In addition to the very public congressional investigations by both
the Senate and House Judiciary Committees, the Justice Department's
Office of Inspector General and Office of Professional Responsibility are
jointly engaged in a far reaching investigation. 42 Justice Department In-
spector General Glenn Fine has a wide purview to investigate "waste,
fraud and abuse" within the Department, and to report his findings to
Congress and the public. 43 The inquiry could well include the admitted
management failures in the dismissal of U.S. Attorneys, improper politi-
cal considerations in hiring decisions, misleading statements by Justice
Department officials to Congress, threats and harassment directed toward
former U.S. Attorneys for speaking out publicly and for testifying before
Congress, possible violations of the criminal provisions of the Hatch Act,
and obstruction of justice.
A. New Mexico: Obstruction of Justice and
Criminal Violations of the Hatch Act
Dramatic testimony given by former U.S. Attorney for New Mex-
ico, David Iglesias, has raised the very real prospect of improper inter-
ference with an ongoing criminal investigation involving public corrup-
tion and the seeking of political advantage. Violations of the obstruction
of justice statute may have occurred and should be investigated.
18 U.S.C. § 1503 provides:
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening let-
ter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede
any grand or petit juror or officer in or of any court of the United
States, or officer who may be serving at any examination or other
proceeding... or injures any such officer, magistrate judge or other
committing magistrate in his person or property on account of the
performance of his official duties, or corruptly or by threats or
force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences,
obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or
40. 5 U.S.C. Appx. § 8(c) (2006).
41. Id. § 4(d).
42. Letter from Glenn Fine, Inspector Gen., Dep't of Justice, to Sen. Patrick Leahy (Aug. 30,
2007), available at http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/docs/leahy-oig (stating that the Office of the
Inspector General will examine whether "statements made by the Attorney General were intention-
ally false, misleading or inappropriate").
43. Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (1978).
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impede, the due administration of justice, shall be punished as pro-
vided in subsection (b). 44
The elements of a primafacie case of obstruction of justice are (1)
the existence of the judicial proceeding; (2) knowledge of or notice of the
judicial proceeding; (3) acting "corruptly" with intent to influence, ob-
struct, or impede the proceeding in the due administration of justice; and
(4) a nexus (although not necessarily one which is material) between the
judicial proceeding sought to be corruptly influenced and the defendant's
efforts.4 5 The omnibus clause of § 1503(a) is a "catchall" provision,
which is broadly construed to include a wide variety of corrupt meth-
ods.46
During 2006 in New Mexico, then-U.S. Attorney David Iglesias led
an investigation which eventually resulted in the indictment and convic-
tion of the Treasurer of the State of New Mexico, an elected
Democrat. Iglesias has testified that he received phone calls from Sena-
tor Pete Domenici and U.S. Representative Heather Wilson (R-N.M.), in
which he was allegedly pressured to accelerate the indictment in order
for it to occur before the November re-election campaign of Representa-
tive Wilson. Iglesias responded to questions before the Senate on March
6, 2007:
SENATOR SCHUMER: Please describe for the committee now, as
best you can, your entire recollection of that communication.
Please tell us what Senator Domenici said and what you said.
DAVID IGLESIAS: Thank you, Sir. I was at home. This was the
only time I'd ever received a call from any member of Congress
while at home during my tenure as United States attorney for New
Mexico.
Mr. Bell called me. I was in my bedroom. My wife was nearby.
And he indicated that the senator wanted to speak with me. He in-
dicated that there were some complaints by some citizens, so I said,
"OK." And he said, "Here's the Senator."
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1503(b)(3) (2006). The criminal penalty provision for obstruction of justice
provides for "imprisonment for not more than 10 years, a fine under this title, or both." Id.
45. See In re Impounded, 241 F.3d 308, 317 n.8 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Cueto, 151
F.3d 620, 633 (7th Cir. 1998).
46. United States v. Andreas, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1065 (N.D. Ill. 1998), aftd, 216 F.3d 645
(7th Cir. 2000). Under this provision, the omnibus clause includes "endeavors to influence, obstruct
or impede... the due administration ofjustice." 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2006).
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So he handed the phone over, and I recognized the voice as being
Senator Pete Domenici. And he wanted to ask me about the matters
of the corruption cases that had been widely reported in the local
media. I said, "All right." And he said, "Are these going to be filed
before November?" And I said I didn't think so, to which he re-
plied, "I'm very sorry to hear that." And then the line went dead.
SENATOR SCHUMER: So in other words, he hung up on you?
MR. IGLEGIAS: That's how I took that. Yes, Sir.47
Former Attorney General Gonzales has admitted he took multiple
phone calls from Domenici urging that U.S. Attorney Iglesias be re-
placed, and has admitted that the President spoke with him about "prob-
lems" with Iglesias. Gonzales has even admitted that one of the reasons
that Iglesias was fired was because Senator Domenici had "lost confi-
dence" in Iglesias.48 One of the last of the U.S. Attorneys to be added to
the list of those to be fired, the name of David Iglesias appeared in Octo-
ber 2006; he was fired within six weeks.49
While these allegations are troubling under any analysis, a thorough
and independent investigation is necessary to determine whether criminal
laws have been violated. Among the considerations facing the Inspector
General is whether the actions of former Attorney General Gonzales in
removing Iglesias constituted obstruction of justice. Attempts to
47. Preserving Prosecutorial Independence, Part II: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (Mar. 6, 2007) (testimony of David Iglesias), available at
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/senatejudiciary hearing_030607.htm.
48. Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Department of Justice Politicizing the Hir-
ing and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?, Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm. Part IV, 110th
Cong. 15 (May 10, 2007), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/content/article/2007/05/10/gonzales testimony_051007.html?hpid=moreheadlines.
Gonzales testified:
But I will tell you this: I was certainly aware of the fact that the senior senator had lost
confidence in Mr. Iglesias beginning in the fall of 2005, and that we had had several
phone conversations where he had expressed serious concerns or reservations about the
performance of the person that he recommended for that position.
Id. (statement in response to question from Rep. Conyers). See also Dan Eggen, Domenici Says He
Contacted Prosecutor, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2007, at Al.
49. E-mail from Kyle Sampson, Chief of Staff to Alberto Gonzales, to Monica Goodling, Dir.
of Public Affairs for the Dep't of Justice (Sept. 13, 2006) (including Charlton, Lam, Chiara, Bogden
and McKay, but not Iglesias, as "[U.S. Attorneys] we should now consider pushing out"), available
at http://judiciary.house.gov/Media/PDFS/DOJDocsPt32-070320.pdf#Page=27. See also E-mail
from Kyle Sampson, Chief of Staff to Alberto Gonzales, to Harriet Miers, White House Counsel &
William Kelly, Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Counsel (Nov. 15, 2006) (including
Iglesias on a list of U.S. Attorneys to be fired), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/Media/PDFS/DOJDocsPt2O7O3l3.pdf#Page=l 5; Eggen & Solomon,
supra note 9.
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influence Iglesias in his prosecution of the public corruption case in New
Mexico, including a retaliatory firing, could well constitute obstruction
of justice, and, at minimum, warrant a full investigation. Although Gon-
zales has claimed he did not create the list of U.S. Attorneys to be fired,
he has admitted that he approved the firings. That he had knowledge of
the high-profile public corruption case being investigated by Iglesias in
New Mexico is virtually certain, given that he has admitted speaking to
Domenici and would almost certainly be expected to have such knowl-
edge as the leader of the Justice Department. Under the broad language
of 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a), it would be hard to imagine that "corruptly influ-
encing" would not extend to firing the United States Attorney in the mid-
dle of a public corruption case because he "lost the confidence" of a
Senator who sought to manipulate the indictments for crass political ad-
vantage.
Other and equally serious questions have been raised by the con-
duct of the former Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty, to whom
U.S. Attorneys reported, and by Kyle Sampson, who was admittedly the
"aggregator" of the list of U.S. Attorneys to be fired.50 Were McNulty
and Sampson aware of the New Mexico case being led by Iglesias? Did
they also speak to Senator Domenici about the case and Iglesias' role in
it? Did McNulty, or Michael Elston, his Chief of Staff Sampson, Monica
Goodling or others seek to punish Iglesias for falling into disfavor with
Senator Domenici, Representative Wilson, or the New Mexico Republi-
cans in his handling of the public corruption case? If the answer is yes,
then all of them should be answering questions (or exercising their right
not to incriminate themselves) before a grand jury.
Obstruction of justice is not the only crime which may have been
committed with respect to the firing of David Iglesias. The criminal pro-
vision of the Hatch Act provides in part:
Whoever, being one of the officers or employees of the United
States mentioned in section 602 of this title, discharges, or pro-
motes, or degrades, or in any manner changes the official rank or
compensation of any other officer or employee, or promises or
threatens so to do, for giving or withholding or neglecting to make
any contribution of money or other valuable thing for any political
purpose, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
three years, or both.5'
50. Hearing, supra note 16 (testimony of Kyle Sampson).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 606 (2006).
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In general, the Hatch Act "limits the political activities of federal
employees in the interests of promoting efficient, merit-based
advancement, avoiding the appearance of politically-driven justice, pre-
venting the coercion of government workers to support political posi-
tions, and foreclosing use of the civil service to build political ma-
chines. ' 52
Under this provision, the firing of Iglesias for failing to use his of-
fice to influence the election of Republicans, in this case the re-election
of Representative Wilson, could constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 606. The numerous complaints to Gonzales by Senator Domenici, the
visits by Republican party leaders from New Mexico with Justice De-
partment officials, and the possible subject matter of Gonzales' conversa-
tion with the President could well become evidence that Iglesias was
fired because he was not a "loyal Bushie" willing to use his office to help
Republicans. Firing a United States Attorney for refusing to participate
in such a blatantly political scheme could well result in the indictment of
those government officials responsible for the firing if they were aware
of and participating in the political purpose. Advancing the indictments
in New Mexico could constitute "contribution of money or other valu-
able thing for any political purpose" as required by the Act. These terms
are given broad reading by courts interpreting them, 53 and may be rea-
sonably extended to include preserving the election for the candidate of a
particular political party, or maintaining the majority in the U.S. House
of Representatives in a close election.
B. Obstruction of Justice in the Southern District of California
As troubling and dramatic as the circumstances were in New Mex-
ico, that state is not the only place where the firing of a U.S. Attorney
may result in criminal charges for impeding justice. In the Southern Dis-
trict of California, U.S. Attorney Carol Lam was fired even as she was
supervising the highest-profile public corruption prosecution in Amer-
ica. Former U.S. Representative Randy "Duke" Cunningham, now
serving an eight-year federal prison term, plead guilty and was sentenced
on March 3, 2006, for conspiracy to commit bribery, mail and wire fraud,
52. Burrus v. Vegliante, 336 F.3d 82, 85-86 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).
53. See generally United States v. Cicco, 10 F.3d 980, 984 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v.
Schwartz, 785 F.2d 673, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1350
(10th Cir. 1998), rev'don other grounds, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999).
54. Editorial, Politics and the Corruption Fighter, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/18/opinion/18thu2.html.
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and tax evasion. 55 In a high-profile investigation, U.S. Attorney Lam, a
well respected former Assistant U.S. Attorney and state trial court judge
in California, spoke out forcefully for the rule of law and against public
56corruption. Paying no heed to the political fallout of having targeted a
powerful Republican as an appointee of a Republican administration,
Lam stated the following at the time of Cunningham's sentencing:
It is clear from the facts set forth in the plea agreement, facts that
Mr. Cunningham admitted in his guilty plea, that this was a crime of
unprecedented magnitude and extraordinary audacity. For more
than four years, Mr. Cunningham asked for and accepted bribes to-
taling more than $2.4 million from two defense contractors, who in
return received favorable treatment from Mr. Cunningham. Mr.
Cunningham used his public office to pressure and influence U.S.
Department of Defense personnel to award and execute government
contracts in a manner that would benefit the defense contractors....
Regrettably for the citizens in the 50th Congressional District, and
for the nation that has a right to the honest services of its representa-
tives, it is abundantly clear that Congressman Cunningham let greed
take priority over his duty to serve the best interests of his constitu-
ents and his country. While Mr. Cunningham has reached a resolu-
tion of his case through a plea agreement and his entry of a guilty
plea today, the investigation continues with respect to other
57co-conspirators.
The "co-conspirators" mentioned by Ms. Lam apparently included
Kyle "Dusty" Foggo, the former Executive Director of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency who resigned a few days in advance of the execution of
search warrants on May 12, 2006.58 Lam alerted the Justice Department
that FBI agents would, at her direction, search Foggo's home in connec-
tion with the Duke Cunningham case. 59  The following day, Kyle
55. Crooked Congressman Going to Prison, CNN.COM, Mar. 3, 2007, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/03/03/cunningham.sentenced/index.html.
56. See Indictments Charge Defense Contractor Brent Wilkes With Corruption Involving
Former CIA Executive Director Kyle 'Dusty' Foggo and Former Congressman Randy 'Duke' Cun-
ningham, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 13, 2006, available at http://www.pmewswire.com/cgi-
bin/stories.pl?ACCT = 04&STORY=/www/story/02-13-2007/0004527077&EDATE = .
57. Statement of U.S. Attorney Carol Lam, Nov. 28, 2005 (on file with the U.S. Attorney's
Office for the Southern District of California), available at
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/politics/cunningham/20051128-1834-lamwords.html.
58. Jerry Kammer and Marcus Stem, Federal Agents Raid home of CIA's No. 3 Boss, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, May 12, 2006, available at
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/nation/20060512-0906-foggo.html.
59. U.S. Attorneys are required to advise the office of the Attorney General and the Deputy
Attorney General in advance of actions which involve politically sensitive or nationally important
matters. Such reports are called "Urgent Reports."
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Sampson e-mailed the White House from the Attorney General's office
and decried "the real problem we have right now with Carol Lam that
leads me to conclude that we should have someone ready to be
nominated on 11/18, the day her 4-year term expires., 60 Given the wide
publicity of the Cunningham political corruption case in U.S. Attorney
Lam's district, it is reasonable to conclude that Gonzales, McNulty,
Sampson, and other senior Justice Department officials were aware of
the underlying judicial proceeding being handled by Carol Lam. As was
the case in New Mexico with U.S. Attorney Iglesias, the Cunningham
investigation led by Lam was very much ongoing, and continued through
her eventual resignation as U.S. Attorney in March 2007.61 Gonzales,
McNulty and Sampson at minimum will have to demonstrate that their
complicity in the removal of Lam had nothing to do with her aggressive
prosecution of powerful Republicans for public corruption. In addition
to the Sampson e-mail urging Lam's dismissal, investigators will seek to
establish whether other senior officials knowingly sought her removal in
connection with the Cunningham investigation. If such evidence is
found, removal of a United States Attorney in the middle of a high-
profile political corruption investigation, particularly where the U.S. At-
torney was personally supervising the case, would undoubtedly come
within the omnibus provisions of the federal obstruction of justice stat-
ute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a).
C. Additional Possible Criminal Violations in
the Removal of United States Attorneys
If it is proven that a criminal conspiracy to obstruct justice or politi-
cize the Justice Department occurred, the removal of all of the U.S. At-
torneys could become a focus for the Inspector General and, eventually,
a Special Prosecutor. For example, unreleased White House e-mail may
indicate a more explicit effort to utilize United States Attorneys to obtain
advantage in ongoing or questionable election fraud, voter fraud, or other
criminal prosecutions. In connection with the public comments of Karl
Rove complaining about voter and election fraud incidents, 62 Kyle
60. E-mail from Kyle Sampson, Chief of Staff to Alberto Gonzales, to William Kelley, Deputy
Assistant to the President and Deputy Counsel (May 11, 2006), available at
http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/docs/lam-emails. Sampson denies that this e-mail was related
to the execution of search warrants by U.S. Attorney Lam in the Cunningham case. Hearing, supra
note 16 (testimony of Kyle Sampson, in response to questions from Sen. Feinstein).
61. Politics and the Corruption Fighter, supra note 54.
62. David Kirkpatrick & Jim Rutenberg, E-mail Shows Rove's Role in Fate of
Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2007, available at
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Sampson linked the dismissal of U.S. Attorneys to Rove in e-mails re-
leased by the Justice Department.
63
In Washington State, my dismissal from my post as U.S. Attorney
was widely speculated as having been connected to the 2004 Governor's
election, which the Justice Department has denied.64  However, former
Attorney General Gonzales has testified he was aware of criticism of the
author for allegedly failing to intervene in the election by bringing crimi-
nal indictments.65  No credible explanation for including me on a list to
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/29/washington/29rove.html?hp; see Eggen & Goldstein, supra
note 22.
63. E-mail from Kyle Sampson, Chief of Staff to Alberto Gonzales, to Chris Oprison, Assoc.
White House Counsel (Dec. 19, 2006), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/Media/PDFS/DOJDocsPt30703i3.pdf#Page=65 (Sampson tells the White
House that appointing Timothy Griffin to replace Bud Cummins in Little Rock was "important to
Karl" Rove).
64. See, e.g., David Bowermaster, McKay Went From Hero to Zero with Justice
Department, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 21, 2007, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2003628399_mckay2 I m.html; see also Bowermas-
ter, GOP Chair Called McKay About '04 Election, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2003616950_mckay I 4m.html.
65. Hearing, supra note 48 (testimony of Alberto Gonzales). During questioning before a
House Judiciary Subcommittee, the former Attorney General admitted he was aware of complaints
against me relating to alleged voter fraud in the 2004 Governor's election in Washington State:
WATT: Well, you obviously haven't listened to the testimony of some of the people in
the department then, because that was an excuse that was advanced initially. And that's
the problem here, Mr. Attorney General. There are so many different excuses advanced
at different times, whenever it's convenient, that you have this appearance that there is
something else there. And in this case, Mr. McKay also failed to aggressively, or as ag-
gressively, prosecute, as some people thought he ought to prosecute, and pursue some
voting fraud cases that were taking place after an election took place.
And it might have had some impact on a Democrat versus a Republican being elected.
So if that concern that the public is concerned about, Mr. Attorney General-if that's at
the bottom of this, that would be an improper motivation for a termination, and would be
illegal. Wouldn't you agree?
GONZALES: I agree that if in fact there was pressure put on Mr. McKay to investigate a
case which didn't warrant an investigation-but obviously, there may be circumstances
where an investigation may have been warranted. And so we'd have to look at the cir-
cumstances of a particular case. I don't recall that when I made my-when I accepted
the recommendation, Congressman, that that was a reason for it, is his efforts with re-
spect to voter fraud. But clearly, I do-going back and looking at the documents and the
correspondences, there was a great deal of concern about his efforts with respect to voter
fraud Because I received a number of letters from groups and outside parties ....
WATT: So you didn't fire him for that reason, but somebody might have put him on the
list for that reason? That's really what you're saying, Mr. Attorney General.
GONZALES: I don't-again, Congressman, I'm assuming that this committee has spo-
ken with everyone who provided input. And, of course, the person who was compiling
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be fired in March 2005 has been lodged, according to the House Judici-
ary Committee report, making it difficult for Gonzales, McNulty, and
Sampson to contend that the dismissal was unrelated to the election fraud
case. If prosecuted for obstruction of justice under these facts, the gov-
emnment would face serious obstacles in proving that each of them was
aware of the criminal investigation underway by the Seattle Division of
the FBI and the United States Attorney's Office, that this constituted a
"judicial proceeding" in the absence of an active grand jury proceeding
or the issuance of grand jury subpoenas,66 and that the U.S. Attorney was
fired to influence or retaliate for his actions on the matter.
In Arizona, the dismissal of U.S. Attorney Paul Charlton was ad-
mittedly based in part on Charlton's handling of a federal death penalty
case in which he sought to speak with Attorney General Gonzales and
overturn his direction to seek death against Charlton's recommenda-
tion.67 Although the Justice Department later sought to characterize this
dispute as a "policy" matter, a more likely explanation is that Charlton
was targeted for removal simply because he exercised his duty to advise
the Attorney General of the reasons for his recommendation against the
death penalty in a particular case. As a general matter, it may be argued
that any federal capital case involves ongoing appeals, potential clem-
ency, and related matters such that it is a "judicial proceeding" as re-
quired by the obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a).
Obviously, Gonzales, McNulty, and others were aware of the case, since
each was aware of Charlton's views on the death penalty aspect, and that
the information, Mr. Sampson, would know better than I. Because I'm a fact witness. I
haven't talked to these other fact witnesses about what happened here.
Hearing, supra note 48 (testimony of Alberto Gonzales).
66. Generally, a pending judicial proceeding is a prerequisite to prosecution under 17 U.S.C.
§ 1503. See, e.g., United States v. Neal, 951 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1992). A proceeding is pending
when the judicial machinery has been activated. See United States v. Gonzales-Mares, 752 F.2d
1485, 1491 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 913 (1985). Courts generally require an active
grand jury proceeding, including, for example, the issuance of grand jury subpoenas. See, e.g.,
United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 678 (3d Cir. 1975). However, if a special prosecutor de-
termines that removal ofa U.S. Attorney was in retaliation for actions taken in an investigation, the
pending proceeding element is not required. See United States v. Roberts, 638 F.2d 134, 135 (9th
Cir. 1981) (per curiam), cert. denied452 U.S. 909 (1981).
67. E-mail from Michael Elston, Chief of Staff to Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty, to
Kyle Sampson, Chief of Staff to Alberto Gonzales (Aug. 15, 2006),
http://judiciary.house.gov/Media/PDFS/DOJDocsPt7-070320.pdf#Page=05. "In the 'you won't
believe this category,' Paul Charlton would like a few minutes of AG's time. I explained that he had
already been given extensive, unusual process and that I did not think that it was a good idea for him
to press this, but he insisted on me making the request. Your thoughts?" Sampson's one word reply:
"Denied." Id.
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Gonzales had overruled Charlton.68 Would firing U.S. Attorney Charlton
"corruptly influence" the death penalty proceeding? Further investiga-
tion could well be warranted if the Inspector General has evidence of
efforts to intimidate U.S. Attorneys in death penalty eligible cases.
D. Possible False Congressional Testimony Charges
An additional area of inquiry, for both the Inspector General and for
the congressional committees continuing their investigations, is the pos-
sibility that one or more Justice Department official has lied to Congress.
Among the possible violations, subject to the facts uncovered by the
Inspector General or the FBI, is obstruction of Congress. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1505 defines the offense and the punishment:
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening let-
ter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors
to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration
of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had
before any department or agency of the United States, or the due
and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any
inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any
committee of either House or any joint committee of the Con-
gress-Shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5
years ....
As in the § 1503(a) obstruction provision, a violator would have to
be aware of the congressional inquiry and its lawful convening, and cor-
ruptly seek to impede the inquiry by intentionally supplying false testi-
mony or records.69 Other possible grounds for criminal prosecution
include 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (perjury) and 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false state-
ments).
Senators have openly accused former Attorney General Gonzales of
lying to them. Following the Senate questioning of Gonzales on April
19, 2007, Senator Mark Pryor (D-Ark.) was quoted as saying, "[t]he At-
torney General not only lied to me as a person but, when he lied to me,
he lied to the Senate and he lied to the people I represent., 70 Among
other problematic testimony is the former Attorney General's statement
to senators: "I would never, ever make a change in a United States
68. Oversight of the Federal Death Penalty Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm.
on the Const., 110th Cong. (June 27, 2007) (statement of Paul K. Charlton), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=2833&witid=6567.
69. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 884, (D.C. Cir. 1990), withdrawn and superseded
in part on reh 'g, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C.Cir. 1990).
70. Hearing, supra note 8 (testimony of Alberto Gonzales).
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Attorney position for political reasons. . . . I would just not do it." 71
When juxtaposed with the testimony of then-Deputy Attorney General
McNulty that U.S. Attorney Bud Cummins was replaced solely to make
way for Karl Rove's former aide, Timothy Griffin, 72 the veracity before
Congress of the former Attorney General is very much in question.
Gonzales further testified before the House Committee on the Judiciary
that he had refrained from discussing the facts of the U.S. Attorney fir-
ings with other Justice Department officials who might also be wit-
nesses.73  This testimony was dramatically disputed by former Justice
Department employee, Monica Goodling, who testified that the Attorney
General had rehearsed his recollections with her in an "uncomfortable"
conversation in his office.74
Yet, it is not only the former Attorney General who appears to have
dissembled. Former Deputy Attorney General McNulty may have, ac-
cording to the House Judiciary Committee Chairman, sought to assist the
"Administration's effort to minimize and obscure the role of White
House personnel in the firings" when he made misleading statements
concerning the role of the White House.75 One committee report con-
cludes this was "an incomplete statement that appears to have under-
stated the involvement of White House individuals in the inception,
development, and approval of the firing plan. 76 McNulty also may have
sought to conceal an important phone call from Senator Domenici
regarding U.S. Attorney Iglesias, when he instructed Monica Goodling to
delete reference to that call from his Senate testimony.7 7
Others who likely have serious concerns (and even more likely,
who have retained criminal defense lawyers) are Kyle Sampson and
7 1. Hearing, supra note 4 (testimony of Alberto Gonzales).
72. Hearing, supra note 12 (testimony of Paul J. McNulty, responding to questions from Sen.
Schumer).
73. Hearing, supra note 48 (testimony of Alberto Gonzales, responding to question from Rep.
Watt).
74. Hearing, supra note 31 (testimony of Monica Goodling, responding to question from Rep.
Davis).
75. McNulty told Senate Judiciary Committee members that, "[t]hese are Presidential appoint-
ments ... so the White House personnel, I'm sure, was [sic] consulted prior to making the phone
calls (firing the U.S. Attorneys)." Hearing, supra note 12 (testimony of Paul J. McNulty, in re-
sponse to question from Sen. Schumer). Disgraced former aide to Gonzales, Monica Goodling, has
alleged that McNulty was "not fully candid with Congress" regarding the White House role in the
firings. Dan Eggen, Officials Say Justice Dept. Based Hires on Politics Before Goodling Tenure,
WASH. POST, May 26, 2007, at A2.
76. Conyers Memorandum, supra note 14, at 15.
77. Hearing, supra note 31 (testimony of Monica Goodling). Goodling has accused the former
Deputy Attorney General of giving false testimony on four separate matters. Id. (in response to
questions from Rep. Davis).
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former McNulty staffers Will Moschella and Michael Elston. Sampson
appears to have knowingly concealed from Congressional investigators
the forced resignation of U.S. Attorney Todd Graves from the Western
District of Missouri, 78 and the role of Karl Rove in securing the appoint-
ment of Timothy Griffin in the Eastern District of Arkansas to replace
the U.S. Attorney Bud Cummins. Moschella served as the official
spokesperson of the Justice Department and provided its responses to the
six subpoenaed U.S. Attorneys before the Subcommittee on Commercial
and Administrative Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary on
March 6, 2007, maintaining that the White House was not involved in
firing the U.S. Attorneys.79 McNulty's resigned Chief of Staff Mike
Elston, in addition to allegedly threatening former U.S. Attorneys if they
testified before Congress, 80 may have lied concerning the development of
the list of U.S. Attorneys to be fired.81
Although the resignations of Gonzales, McNulty, and others have
slowed the pace of congressional inquiry for now, their evasive and con-
flicting testimony virtually guarantees further hearings before both the
House and Senate Judiciary Committees. Future hearings, however, may
take a back seat to the report by the Inspector General and the possibility
of a criminal investigation.
VI. TOWARD ACCOUNTABILITY-
SELECTION OF A SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
While the timing of the Inspector General's report is not publicly
known, the Inspector General Act provides that, where merited, a referral
for investigation of possible crimes may be made at the discretion of the
Inspector General of the Justice Department. 82  Such referrals are
typically made to the United States Attorney's Office for the District of
Columbia. As this office is currently occupied by a former staffer to
78. Murray Wass, Administration Withheld E-mails About Rove, NAT'L J., May 10, 2007,
http://news.nationaljournal.com/articles/0705 I Onj 1 .htm.
79. H. Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law, Hearing on the Dismiss-
als of U.S. Attorneys, 110th Cong. (Mar. 6, 2007) (testimony of Will Moschella), available at
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/housejudiciary hearing_030607.htm.
80. Id. (testimony of Bud Cummins, in response to questions from Rep. Cohen).
81. Mary Beth Buchanan, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania and former
Director of the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, has reportedly testified that Elston lied to her
about how he gathered names for potential dismissals of U.S. Attorneys. See Conyers Memoran-
dum, supra note 14, at 18.
82. See 5 U.S.C. App. § 8E (2006).
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Alberto Gonzales, 83 the Justice Department must seek a special prosecu-
tor who will be seen as independent of the White House and of the Jus-
tice Department itself. More urgently, a special prosecutor investigating
a criminal referral from the Inspector General (or upon the direction of
the Attorney General) must be acceptable to the Democrats who control
both houses of Congress and must be seen by the public as trustworthy,
capable, and independent. The following are among those who should
be considered and possess the range of experience and capability to serve
as Special Prosecutor:
Joseph E. diGenova, Washington, D.C. Partner, diGenova and
Toensing; U.S. Attorney for District of Columbia, 1983-1988;
Counsel, Senate Judiciary Committee, Chief Counsel and Staff
Director Senate Rules Committee; numerous staff positions in
Congress and the Justice Department.
Edward L. Dowd, Jr., St. Louis, Mo. Partner, Dowd Bennett LLP;
U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Missouri, 1993-1999;
Counsel, Senator John C. Danforth, Waco Investigation; Assistant
U.S. Attorney, Director, Organized Crime Drug Task Force for
South Central United States.
Atlee W. Wampler III, Miami, Fla., Partner, Wampler Buchanan
Walker Chabrow & Banciella P.A.; U.S. Attorney for Southern Dis-
trict of Florida, 1980-1982; Captain, U.S. Army, Military Intelli-
gence, 1968-1970; Special Attorney U.S. Dep't of Justice, Organ-
ized Crime and Racketeering, 1970-1975; Attorney-In-Charge, Mi-
ami Strike Force, Organized Crime and Racketeering, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 1975-1980.
Joe D. Whitley, Atlanta, Ga., Partner, Alston & Bird; U.S. Attorney
for the Middle District of Georgia, 1981-1986; U.S. Attorney for
the Northern District of Georgia, 1990-1993; Acting Associate At-
torney General of the U.S., General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Home-
land Security.
83. Jeffrey A. Taylor currently serves as the interim U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia.
He served on Attorney General Alberto Gonzales' personal staff as Counselor to the Attorney Gen-
eral.
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VII. BINDING UP THE WOUNDS
Without question, the Justice Department needs healing.84 The hard
working women and men who serve as Assistant United States
Attorneys, trial attorneys, and key support staff throughout the United
States and in Washington, D.C. have been embarrassed by political lead-
ership which has thoroughly failed them. To these dedicated profession-
als must be added the Special Agents who help lead investigations of
serious federal crimes, not only in the five law enforcement components,
but in all federal law enforcement agencies who depend on the Justice
Department to advise them, prosecute their cases, and defend convictions
won in large part through their efforts.
All have dedicated their careers to the search for the truth, and in-
stead have been forced to watch while their senior leadership have
feigned memory loss, failed to take responsibility for their actions, and
sought to blame subordinates for their own failures. While these law
enforcement professionals bravely continue their critical work keeping us
safe and protecting us from violent criminals, they carry the heavy bur-
den of broken trust.
The resignations of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney
General, the Associate Attorney General85 and much of their senior staff
have undoubtedly been a relief to those who have observed the faulty
memories, political maneuverings, and outright incompetence at the Jus-
tice Department. 86 With the resignation of Alberto Gonzales on Septem-
ber 14, 2007, the President and the Senate have the opportunity to restore
84. The Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary may have put this in perspective
as well as any of the scores of newspaper editorials criticizing the Administration and the Justice
Department during the last months of Alberto Gonzales tenure:
But these actions we've heard are from the administration. I really believe they threaten
to undermine the effectiveness and professionalism of U.S. attorneys' offices around the
country. Not since the Saturday night massacre, when I was a young lawyer and Presi-
dent Nixon forced the firing of the Watergate prosecutor Archibald Cox, have we wit-
nessed anything of this magnitude. The calls to a number of U.S. attorneys across the
country last December by which they were forced to resign were extraordinary. I don't
know of any precedent for it. What is more disconcerting is that, unlike during Water-
gate, there is no Elliot Richardson or William Ruckelshaus seeking to defend the inde-
pendence of the prosecutors. And any of us who have ever been a prosecutor know the
independence is the most important thing you have. But instead in this case the Attorney
General, the Deputy Attorney, the Executive Office of the U.S. Attorneys and the White
House all collaborated in these actions. I think that's wrong.
Hearing, supra note 47 (statement of Sen. Leahy), available at
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/senatejudiciaryhearing_030607.htm.
85. William Mercer, the acting Associate Attorney General has relinquished this post, but
continues to serve as U.S. Attorney for the District of Montana.
86. "He who commits injustice is ever made more wretched than he who suffers it." Plato
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leadership to the Justice Department and preserve what has been risked:
prosecutorial independence, compassion, fairness, and the nonpolitical
exercise of government power in criminal prosecutions.
8 7
Attorney General Mukasey should move immediately to assure the
Congress, the courts, and the American people of his belief in these prin-
ciples and take steps to prevent the abuses of his predecessor. These
steps should include (1) limiting the points of contact between the Justice
Department and the White House; (2) eliminating all but specially desig-
nated congressional liaisons and requiring notification and approval of
other contacts with members of Congress; (3) reaffirming Executive
Branch support for presidential appointees and Senate confirmation for
senior Justice Department appointees, including U.S. Attorneys; (4) af-
firming and supporting commitment to the independent role of U.S. At-
torneys from both local and national politics; and (5) holding accountable
Justice Department employees who have failed, or in the future fail to
uphold the values of independence, truthfulness, nonpartisanship, and the
nonpolitical pursuit of justice.
VIII. CONCLUSION
With the long-awaited resignation of Alberto Gonzales as Attorney
General, the Justice Department has closed a disreputable chapter un-
precedented in its history. With the most senior positions vacated by
those tainted by this scandal, federal prosecutors and trial attorneys have
done their very best to continue the critical day-to-day work of a proud
but scarred institution. Though they have not been shown the gratitude
they deserve, the men and women still serving as U.S. Attorneys, Assis-
tant U.S. Attorneys, and the line trial attorneys serving in the Justice De-
partment deserve our thanks and admiration. They have carried on
protecting us from violent criminals, terrorists, spies, human traffickers
and drug dealers, while those responsible for leading them dishonored
their offices by attempting to politicize their work.
The next leaders of the Justice Department and of the United States
Government have tremendous challenges ahead of them. We remain a
nation at great risk of terrorist attack. We also remain a nation at risk of
violating the very rights and laws which have distinguished us among the
peoples of the earth.
87. On September 17, 2007, the President nominated retired U.S. District Judge Michael B.
Mukasey, formerly of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, to the office of
Attorney General of the United States. Judge Mukasey was confirmed by the Senate on November
8, 2007, and sworn into office on November 9, 2007. Attorney General Mukasey is a former Assis-
tant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York.
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All Americans must recognize that keeping us safe and protecting
our rights are both constitutional imperatives, and preserving them pre-
sents challenges requiring enormous commitment and competence. This
can be done by careful, skillful and committed public servants. Yet, all
who cherish our freedom know that one right cannot be pursued at the
cost of the others, for if we do, we risk both our identity and our survival.
The Justice Department can never again be a home to those who
view the rule of law as an obstacle to our security, who view the courts
and federal judges as weak links in our pursuit of terrorists or spies, or
who view United States Attorneys as political extensions of the White
House or of the Republican or Democratic parties.
